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A. Z. RICHARDS and A. H. SORE~itf~;.:~-,~ ... ,
Partners, doing business under the
firm name of CALDWELL, RICHARDS &
SORENSEN,
Plaintiff and Respondent

vs.
LAKE HILLS, a corporation
Defendant aoo Appellant

Appellant's Brief
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court
for Salt Lake County,
Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr., Judge
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4762 South State
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Attorneys for Appellant
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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

A. Z. RICHARDS and A. H. SORENSEN,
Partners, doing business under the
firm name of CALDWELL, RICHARDS &
SORENSEN,
Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.
LAKE HILLS, a corporation
Defendant and Appellant

Case No.
9g85

Appellant's Brief
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action to recover for the value of engineering
services rendered by the Plaintiff for the Defendant.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried by the court without a jury. From a
verdict and judgment for the Plaintiff, Defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment al1ld judgment
in its favor as a matter of law, or that failing, a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Z. Richards, a partner in the Plaintiff firm was engaged by Charles Merrill, agent for the Defendant, to do the
engineering for 3 cemetery. They had worked together before
on other similar projects. (R5) The arrangements in this matter
were discussed first in April, 1954. (R 14) Services were ren-
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dered from that time until 196o on the Lake Hills Memorial
Park, IOIOI South State, Salt Lake County. Many maps and
drawings were prepared laying out the roads and various sections of the burial grounds. Much of the work was done at the
home of A. Z. Richards. Arrangements as to time of payment
were n,ebulous with the Defendant's agents Merrill and Jex
contending that Richards agreed to do the work on his own
time and to await payment until the land was paid. There
was agreement that the services were to be billed at double the
amount. (R 6) Statements were rendered accordingly, the first
on December I, I955 regular price $4,I98.2o, then doubled.
Discussion of payment was had in July, 1960 and a $w,ooo.oo Debenture Bond was prepared, charged, tendered and
received by the Plaintiff. (R 46) Defendant contends there was
an accord and satisfaction with the bond. Plaintiff contends it
was a tender only and Plaintiff was entitled to the reasonable
value of the services within a reasonable time. The bond tendered was one payable by the Defendant from a proposed sinking fund to be payable in I97 5.
The lower court entered judgment against the Defendant
in the sum of $9,6 I 6.81.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING QUANTUM
MERUIT FOR THE PLAINTIFF.
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED A FINDING OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WHICH THE COURT
SHOULD BE RENDERED.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW
MR. HOMER R. DON TO TESTIFY CONCERNING THE
DEBENTURE BOND AND ITS ISSUANCE.
2
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POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING QUANTUl\1
MERUIT FOR THE PLAINTIFF.
Where there is proof of a special agreement to pay a particular amount or in a particular manner, the law will not imply a promise to pay the value of services rendered.
58 Am. Jur. Work and Labor p 515
Gjurich vs. Fieg (Cal) 129 p 464
Here, there was ·a special agreement between the parties
as to the time and method of payment. The Plaintiff, Richards,
stated that he was not concerned about payment when he
stated (R 6):
" . . we never talked about pay for a long time,
quite a long time. I think several months-probably more.
I wasn't concerned. I figured that he would treat me all
right and I think the next time we talked, when I talked
about it and he said, 'Well, you keep track of your time
and you just consider it double your regular fee; your
regular expense. You just keep track of it and make it
double what you ordinarily would do', which I did."
The first discussion as to time of payment was had at the
cemetery in April, 1954· Mr. Merrill said (R 41):
"I'm trying to build a Memorial Park. I know you
know how to set up the engineering. I cannot pay you,
this is a non-profit park. We have no stockholders to
get the money from. I am waiting for my money. I put
money in this park and I am going to wait for my
money. Now if you want to do the same as me, we will
double your fee."
William R. Jex testified of a similar arrangement for himself and that Richards acknowledged and supported such an
agreement (R 58):
"I told him yes, I was interested in investing money.
and told him that it looked like this would be a good
thing; .that it might take some time to develop and I
3
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was going to put mine in and wait until it developed anod
get the ground paid for, and what not, before we
realized any money out of it. And he said he was doing
the same thing. He was going to do the work and he
was waiting for the money the same as I was."
Richards' testimony was inconsistent. First he said he
agreed to the double fe~ and to wait for his money. (See exhibit
# 2) Next he stated he sent the bond back because it did not
cover the double fee. (R 69)
"Q: Now when you returned the bond to Mr. Merrill and stated that the bond of $ 1 o,ooo.oo didn't cover
the cost incurred, you were referring to the double figure of $I ~ooo.oo were you not?

"A: That's right."
This after he had stated his position and tried to change
the arrangements between the parties (R 12):
"Q: Well, will you state then, Mr. Richards, the
substance of that conversation you had in 1960 or I¢I?

"A: I was concerned about my finances. I needed
money and I called Charlie to see if he couldn't arrange
to let me have some mon.ey on this account, so I could
have something that I could raise some money on."
Under cross examination Mr. Richards further admitted
the agreement to wait (R I 5):
"Q: And do you recall at that time Mr. Jex making the statement to you that he had to wait for his
mop.ey, too?

"A: Oh, he may have done, but I don't think he
talked about salaries or me being paid. He may have
said that.
"Q: Do you recall making a statement to him that
you knew you were going to have to wait for your
money for a while?

4
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"Oh, I don't remember saying it, but I could have
said it very well. I had an understanding definitely with
Charlie that we wouldn't be paid promptly as the work
was done."
Unless there was a new agreement reached between the
parties, the former agreement must stand. The substance of the
first was that Richards would wait for his money until the land
was paid and then he would get double the fee for waiting.
The court has no right to make a new agreement for the parties. However, the parties, at Mr. Richards' insistence, discussed
new arrangements and payment by bond was discussed. Mr.
Richards, holding to the first agreement sent the bond back because it did not cover double the fee. Merrill alleged the
satisfaction of $I o,ooo.oo with a bond specifying a definite
date of payment in I975· Richards, after holding the bond several days unilaterally declared the new arrangements unsatisfactory and then refused to abide by the original arrangements
which specifically covered the payment of the work.
Thus, the theory of Quantum Meruit was errol1!Cously applied by the trial court.
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED A FINDING OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WHICH THE COURT
SHOULD HAVE RENDERED.
From the testimony given to the Court it was clear that
the parties herein agreed to a sum for the work done, that
sum being $I o,oooo.oo, and that the Debenture Bond presented
by Mr. Merrill to Mr. Richards in that amount would constitute payment thereof. This agreement, of course, ·constituted
satisfaction of the debt in a different medium from that called
for by the original agreement of payment when land was sold,
thereby bringing it within the general rule set forth in I Am.
Jr. Accord and Satisfaction p 242:
"It is well recognized that if a creditor accepts payment of a liquidated demand in a different mode or
medium from that called for by the contract between
5
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the parties, in full discharge of the demand, there is a
sufficient new or additional consideration to support the
transaction as an accord and satisfaction."
The following questions suggest themselves in this point:
Did the parties agree that the Debenture Bond would be
accepted as payment of the account? ( 2) And, if so, was there
consideration for this alleged agreement.
( I )

We believe that both questions must be answered affirmatively. The evidence shows that the sum of $ IO,ooo.oo was a figure discussed by the parties, based upon the actual services rendered and the agreed "double" price to be paid, as the compromised payment figure based upon acceptance of the bond.
The same was adequate consideration for the agreement.
From the evidence it appears that the Plaintiff did accept
the bond and that the matter then came under the general rule
of accord and satisfaction. This general rule was set forth in
Reeves and Co. vs. Phillips (Okla) I 56 p 1179.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW
MR. HOMER R. DON TO TESTIFY CONCERNING THE
DEBENTURE BOND AND ITS ISSUANCE.
The court sustained the objection of Plaintiff's attorney to
Defendant's questioning of Mr. Homer R. Don concerning the
issuance of the Debenture Bond issued to the Plaintiff Richards
by the Defendant. The Appellant now argues that the Court,
by sustaining this objection, erred.
The matter of the Debenture Bond, its issuance and acceptance, was testified to by the Plaintiff Richards, by the
Plaintiff's witness Valle, and by the Defendant's witness Merrill. In the testimony of each of the witnesses, the matter of
discussion concerning the acceptance of the bond, the amount
of the bond, the type and nature of the bond, and its actual
presentation were all heard by the court. In order to have the
full facts of the manner in: which the bond was actually issued,
executed, and presented since the same was not denied by any
6
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of the witnesses, the Court should have permitted the testimony of Mr. Don with reference to these items since he was
the person who actually prepared the bond for signature and
delivery. Failure of the court to permit this testimony after accepting the previous testimony of the witnesses, constitutes prejudicial error since the issuance, delivery, and acceptance of the
bond was basic to the establishment of Defendant's position in
the case before the court.
SUMMARY
From the evidence before the court it is apparent that the
parties at the time of the original negotiations agreed that the
Plaintiff Richards should perform the work involved and that
he would, together with the other members of the Lake Hills
organization, wait until the completion of the project for the
payment of his funds. That as consideration for the delay in this
payment he was to receive double the normal fees charged for
the services rendered. This agreement was apparently acceptable to the Plaintiff since the matter continued for six years
without demand for payment. Thereafter, the Plaintiff not
making a formal demand for payment, but requesting that some
evidence of payment be presented, discussed with the Defendant
the acceptance of a Debenture Bond in a sum which sum was
detennined by the parties to be in the amount of $I o,ooo.oo to
represent payment of the account then existing. It appears that
under the new agreement the figure of $I o,ooo.oo was agreed
upon by the parties as being an amount adequate to cover the
expenses involved and that acceptance of the bond would give
a specific date of payment rather than a oon-specific date
theretofore accepted by the parties, which date was the date
that the land was paid for. The evidence further shows that the
bond was accepted by the Plaintiff and held by Mr. Richards,
which completes the requirements to show that the bond was
accepted in the place of the money account carried by the
Plaintiff Richards. The Plaintiff then tried to abbrogate all
agreements between the parties and brought the action in the
court below as a means of altering the agreements between the
7
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parties. It is the opinion of the Appellant herein that there
was an actual accord and satisfaction between the parties and
that the Debel1!ture Bond was accepted and received by the
Plaintiff thereunder. It is further the opinion of the Apellant
that the failure of the court to find an accord and satisfaction and the court's failure to permit all of the evidence in
support of said position to be heard by the court constitutes
error by the court and that the matter should be referred to
the District Court for re-trial in order that the full disclosure
of the facts and agreements of the parties can be made.
The Defendant-Appellant herein prays that this court reverse the judgment of the lower court and order judgment entered for the Defendant, or if such reversal not be granted
that a new trial be ordered with instructions that the lower
court permit all of the evidence to be presented to the court as
set forth herein.
The Defendant-Appellant herein prays that this court reof fact do oot support a judgment for the Plaintiff and that
exercise of this ·court's responsibility to review the record and
evidence before the trial court will substantiate the Defendant's
position that there was in fact an accord and satisfaction between the parties and that the account sued upon by the Plaintiff was in fact satisfied by the acceptance of the Debenture
Bond.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT REES DANSIE and
WALTER R. ELLETT,
Attorneys for Appellant

8

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

